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Editor in Chief’s Foreword
On behalf of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, I proudly introduce
Issue 2 of Volume 47, “The First Amendment in a Digital Era.” The authors
in this Issue engage in breakthrough discourse on the topics of addictive
speech in video games and pornography, the evolution of dog-whistles to
blowhorns, the rhetoric of “treason” on digital platforms, and chatbot speech.
At a time where most (if not all) forms of speech interact with digital media,
it is critical to explore what First Amendment implications exist (or should
desist) in this form of communication.
Rising scholar Luke Morgan launches this Issue with a trailblazing question:
how should the First Amendment treat intentionally addictive speech?
Addictive products—such as tobacco, alcohol, and gambling—are
considered legitimate regulatory targets. While expressive products—such
as newspapers, books, movies, and video games—have been considered
essentially immune from content-based regulation, due to the First
Amendment. Morgan posits that social research indicates certain behavioral
addictions premised on the compulsive use of expressive products—
particularly video games and pornography—are real dysfunctions of the
brain and regulators are beginning to unsteadily lurch into action, without
any evidence that they are taking the First Amendment into account. Morgan
proposes that, under current doctrine, any such regulation must satisfy strict
scrutiny. More fundamentally, Morgan argues, intentionally addictive
expression does not merit First Amendment coverage.
Charles Adside, III of the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor bridges the
noise discussed in Issue 1, with unconstitutional blowhorns disguised as
Presidential Executive Orders. Adside advances that the recently-litigated
travel ban Executive Orders were blowhorns used by President Donald J.
Trump to exclaim his disapproval of Islam. Adside concludes that the
President’s online statements, however, are not needed to find that the orders
violate the Religion Clauses. Though the Supreme Court held that the order
it reviewed was religiously neutral, Adside argues that all three orders
violated the Religion Clauses on their own terms, structure, and
circumstances. Through a paralleled analysis on Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and the travel ban executive order trilogy, Adside argues that
the Court “put on blinders,” resulting in shortsighted view that is contrary to
well-settled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
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Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law at
University of Detroit Marcy School of Law, J. Richard Broughton, then
provides a contemporary constitutional discourse on the rhetoric of treason.
Broughton provides a thorough explanation of what the Treason Clause of
the Constitution requires and even points to some of President Trump’s
actions which are, arguably, treacherous. Ultimately, Broughton asserts the
constitutional influence that treason-talk implies, especially when it stems
from the President of the United States, who is expected to speak
constitutionally sound. Broughton rightfully warns that there are still
important conversations to be had about American treason in both the
political and legal arenas, thus, if Americans value the criminalization of
national disloyalty, he suggests, treason discourse should reach for the
Constitution, not ignore it.
Senior Notes Editor for the Quarterly, Hilda Kajbaf, concludes this Issue as
she contemplates the constitutional implications the “Siris” and “Alexas” of
today may have in First Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, Kajbaf
examines whether the Free Speech Clause protects chatbot speech and
whether the chatbot itself or the programmer deserves those rights. Kajbaf
posits two ways to close this doctrinal gap. First, she argues, the Free Speech
Clause could but should not apply to chatbot speech for policy reasons.
Second, if the Supreme Court extends constitutional protections to chatbot
speech, the Court should identify the chatbot programmer as the speaker.
Ultimately, Kajbaf argues that Free Speech rights exist on a continuum, and
thus recognition of chatbot speech would not be a revolutionary concept, but
an evolutionary one.
I deeply appreciate all editors of the Quarterly for their diligent efforts in
making Issue 2 of this volume possible.
Respectfully,
Wendy Melissa Hernandez
Editor in Chief, Volume 47
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly

